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Abstract
Brazil provided at 2004 an interesting natural experiment concerning personal credit. The
government implemented a new law that allows some ￿nancial institutions to o⁄er a speci￿c
type of credit. This new law removes a signi￿cant share of the moral hazard problem, since
the main feature of this type of credit is the deduction of the debt repayment directly from
the debtors￿payroll check, eliminating the choice of default when debtors are able to pay
their loans with their wage. Taking advantage of this fact, we estimate - using the di⁄erence-
in-di⁄erence procedure - the cost of such type of informational failures. We ￿nd that the new
law produced a decrease in the interest rate charged to personal loans, while the volume of
personal credit increased, as expected, improving personal credit market conditions. Both
e⁄ects are economically and statistically signi￿cant.
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Resumo
No ano de 2004 o Brasil proporcionou um interessante experimento natural no que diz
respeito ao crØdito pessoal. O governo implementou uma nova lei que permite algumas insti-
tui￿ıes ￿nanceiras a oferecer um tipo espec￿￿co de crØdito. Essa nova lei elimina uma parte
signi￿cativa do problema de azar moral, uma vez que a principal caracter￿stica desse tipo de
emprØstimo Ø a possibilidade de deduzir seu pagamento diretamente da folha de pagamento
dos devedores, eliminando a escolha do default quando devedores sªo capazes de pagar de seus
emprØstimos com seus salÆrios. Aproveitando esse fato, estimamos - usando o procedimento
de diferen￿as-em-diferen￿as - o custo de tal tipo de falha informacional. Como resultado,
encontramos que a nova lei proporcionou uma redu￿ªo nos juros cobrados pelos emprØsti-
mos pessoais, enquanto que o volume de emprØstimos aumentou, melhorando as condi￿ıes
do mercado de crØdito pessoal. Ambos os efeitos sªo estatisticamente e economicamente
signi￿cativos.
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11 Introduction
At the end of 2003 the Brazilian Congress approved a new law that regulates payroll loans. The
payroll loan is a type of personal credit with repayments directly deducted from the borrowers￿
payroll check, which, in practice, makes a collateral out of future income.
Before the implementation of the new law, only workers, pensioners and retired workers from
the public sector had access to this type of credit. The new law comes to provide such credit
to private workers associated to trade unions, pensioners and retired workers from the National
Institution of Social Security (INSS)1. Only some ￿nancial institutions (those authorized by the
government) are able to provide this loan for the INSS bene￿ciaries.
The new law provides to creditors the capacity to receive their loans￿repayment immediately,
whenever the debtors have enough wage to do it. Thus, such type of loan eliminates a signi￿cant
part of the strategic default, diminishing the informational failure costs, as moral hazard. The
reduction of default￿ s probability increases the expected repayment for the lenders making them
willing to o⁄er more credit at better terms.
Taking advantage of this natural experiment our objective is to identify the average e⁄ect of
the new law on personal credit, more speci￿cally over the amount of new loans and interest rates.
Also, besides the ￿nal impact over personal loans, we aim at verifying both the direct and indirect
e⁄ects of the new law. In this paper we call direct e⁄ect the impact of the new law over the ￿nancial
institutions that were authorized by the government to o⁄er the payroll loans, and indirect e⁄ect
the impact over the ￿nancial institutions that were not allowed to o⁄er such type of loans.
The econometric method used in this paper is the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence procedure. Our
analysis uses the fact only the personal credit2 was bene￿ted with the new law, making them the
treatment group. As control group we use automobile loans since this type of credit has similar
features when compared with personal loans3, also since the interest rate charged to automobile
credit is lower than the one charged to personal credit, it minimizes the potential migration e⁄ect
that could happen if another type of loan with higher interest rate was used. In the empirical
section we address the test of quality of such control, showing that it is a good control. The
variation across time and type of credit provides a potential instrument to identify the causal
e⁄ect of the new law on personal credit market.
The di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence approach owns several advantages. Our estimator has less bias than
a simple mean estimator once we have a control group. For example, in the period before the new
law￿ s enforcement the mean of the basic interest rate (taxa selic) was 1.63% per month while in
the period after the enforcement this mean rate was 1.36%. If we estimated the new law￿ s e⁄ect
using the simple di⁄erence between the interest rate for the treatment group before and after new
law￿ s enforcement we would have a biased estimator, since part of the interest rate decrease in this
period is due to the basic interest rate fall. With the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence procedure we can have
an unbiased estimator without any kind of macroeconomic control. Otherwise, if we estimated the
e⁄ect using the simple mean we would have to include macroeconomic controls, which increase the
number of parameters to be estimated, putting more uncertainty in our estimation and reducing
the power of the test. Also, the exogenous nature of the new law is a good opportunity to study
how the costs of informational failures a⁄ects the personal credit market, without endogeneity
1The Brazilian pension system, a pay-as-you-go scheme, is publicly managed by this governmental agency, INSS.
2Personal credit is composed by two modalities of credit: CDC (direct credit to consumer) and payroll loans.
3The similarity between both types of credit comes from the collateral. The personal credit, composed by
CDC (direct credit to consumer) and payroll loans, owns as collateral the client banking account and the payroll
check respectively, i.e, the bank can deduct the loan repayment direct from the client account and payroll check.
Automobile credit, instead, owns as collateral the vehicle that was bought with such loan.
2problems.
In the end, we ￿nd that the new law that regulates payroll loans is actually associated with an
increase of the volume of new personal loans and a reduction in its interest rates, which indicates
that the costs generated by information failures is highly signi￿cant for the personal credit market.
For the institutions directly e⁄ected the same results are observed, but stronger. Financial institu-
tions that were not directly a⁄ected also su⁄ered, in some way, an impact with the implementation
of the new law. In this case, however, we notice a reduction in the volume of the new personal
loans, which represents a migration of clients from ￿nancial institutions that are not able to o⁄er
payroll loans to institutions that are allowed to do that. Also, in the same direction of directly
a⁄ected ￿nancial institutions, a reduction in the interest rate for personal loans was observed.
The explanation for this result comes from the fact that the demand for credit decreases for such
institutions due to the migration of their clients to institutions bene￿ted with the new law.
As the measure of the indirect impact of the new law on the institutions not able to give payroll
loans shows, this event meant a downward shift of personal credit￿ s demand for such ￿nancial
institutions. So, using only this sample, we are able to estimate the credit supply elasticity of
personal loans. To do this we divide the proportional estimated e⁄ect on the new loans by the
proportional estimated e⁄ect on the interest rate. The results point to an estimated elasticity
varying from 8.7 to 10.8. These numbers mean that a 1% variation in the interest rate causes new
loans variation between 8.7% and 10.8%. Thus, the estimated elasticity shows a very steep credit
supply.
On this subject Costa and Mello (2005) estimated the e⁄ect of judicial decision on the legality
of payroll debt loans in Brazil. In June 2004, a high-level federal court upheld a regional court
ruling that had declared payroll deduction illegal. Evidence indicates that it had an adverse impact
on banks￿risk perception, on interest rates and on the amount lent. Coelho, Garcia and Mello
(2006) studied the presence of credit rationing in the Brazilian market using two di⁄erent tests.
First, they tested interest rate stickiness and then they do a natural experiment using the new law
in order to detect credit rationing for corporate ￿rms. In the ￿rst test they found no evidence of
interest rate stickiness. In the second one, interest rate went up and new loans volume went down
after a negative supply shock. Both evidences go on opposite directions to credit rationing theory
predictions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we describe the new law and
its particularities; in section 3 we describe the database used and the main descriptive statistics;
section 4 presents the empirical results; and section 5 concludes.
2 The New Law
The speci￿c legislation of payroll loans is not new in the Brazilian ￿nancial scenario. The Law
8,112 of December 1990 already validated such type of credit, however applying just to workers,
retires and pensioners of the public sector. For the private sector there was no speci￿c law so
far, which brought serious di¢ culties for the development of this type of credit. Private retires
and pensioners didn￿ t have permission to do such operation and private workers should create
a particular instrument between three parts: employee, employer and ￿nancial institution. The
signi￿cant change in this legislation occurred in September 2003, when the government sent to
the House of Representatives the MP4 130 that subsequently, in December 2003, turned into Law
4MP is the abbreviation of Medida Provis￿ria that is a legislative device in which the executive sends a bill
to congress that is e⁄ective immediately, pending approval. It has an urgency status that forces the legislator to
appreciate its merit. For practical purposes, it is almost equivalent to a full-blown law.
310,820. The new law created juridical security of salary consignation through private companies
and the National Institution of Social Security (INSS) to private sector formal workers and retired
workers respectively. Such type of loans has some boundaries related to the agent income, however.
Monthly deductions are limited to thirty percent of agents￿disposable wage5; the loans should
have ￿x payment during the amortization period; and rescissory earns6 can be consigned for the
amortization of the remainder debt. Employers have several obligations relative to the values
and information that are passed to the ￿nancial institutions and employees. To make competitive
conditions to the employees, the participation of the trade union entities representing the employees
is obligatory, but despite the agreement between the trade unions and some ￿nancial institution,
the employee is free to choose any ￿nancial institution that supply this type of credit.
Despite the law be in force since September 2003, just in April 20047 it really took e⁄ect
when the government authorized the Caixa Econ￿mica Federal8 to o⁄er this type of credit to the
pensioners and retired workers from INSS, supported by the new law. Subsequently, BMG (Bank
of Minas Gerais) was the ￿rst private bank to assign such agreement. Today there are forty four
￿nancial institutions authorized by the government to supply this type of credit to pensioners and
retired workers from INSS9.
3 Description of the data and Descriptive Statistics
The database comes from Central Bank of Brazil according to circular 2.957 of 12/30/1999 and
comunicado 7.569 of 05/20/2000.
The database contains daily information about new loans and interest rate. All information
is displayed by ￿nancial institution, type of loan indexation (pre￿xed, interest rate indexation,
exchange rate indexation and price indexation) and kind of borrower (household or ￿rm).
The article uses information about personal loans and automobile loans. Personal loans are
credit to households, with considerable screening by ￿nancial institutions. The bank￿ s client must
have an account with the bank and generally the bank deducts the loans payment from this
account, when this has enough funds. Personal loans are composed by two modalities of credit:
CDC (direct credit to consumer) and payroll loans. The di⁄erence between these two kinds of
loans is that in the ￿rst one there is no guarantee that the client will not change the bank that he
receives his wage while in the payroll loans the client is not allowed to change the bank that he
receives his wage once he has singed a loan contract with the bank. These two kinds of loans are
not linked with the purchase of a speci￿c good, so the borrower can buy any kind of good or even
repay other debts with the loans￿proceeds. We use only the pre￿xed loans, since it is the most
usual type of personal credit.
Automobile loans are credit to households that are used to buy automobiles. In this kind of
credit the automobile is the collateral of the transaction. Like in the previous case we use only
pre￿xed loans since they are the most usual in this market.
The sample consists in a group of 112 ￿nancial institutions o⁄ering personal loans and 57
5Wage after the compulsory deductions like taxes, pensions, etc.
6Rescissory earns comprise all rights of the employee for a contractual break.
7To de￿ne the exact month that a institution became able to give payroll loans we used the following criteria:
when the date of the deal signature was in the ￿rst half of the month we considered the same month, otherwise we
considered the next month. For example, Caixa Econ￿mica singed the deal in 04/19/2004, so we considered May
as the date that it became able.
8The Caixa Econ￿mica Fedral is the biggest public bank.
9For more details about the date of authorization see Appendix A.
4o⁄ering automobile loans. From the 112 institutions of personal loans market there is a sub
sample of 40 ￿nancial institutions that are able to give payroll loans according to the new law.
We run our empirical tests using monthly data generated through the daily data. The new
loans variable is constructed by summing of daily values over the whole month. For the interest
rates variable, we use the monthly average, weighting up by respective new loan volume. The
sample period is from January 2003 to October 2005, so our sample consists of 34 months and 57
and 112 cross sections units of automobile and personal loans respectively (5,746 observations).





















Now we present some descriptive statistics concerning personal and automobile loans before and
after the new law of payroll loans take e⁄ect. Figure 1 illustrates a strong increase of the new loans
volume for personal and automobile loans in the period after the new law take e⁄ect. The monthly
average of personal credit new loans increased from R$35.4 millions to R$68.7 millions, i.e., a rise
of R$33.3 millions which meant a growth rate of 94.2%. The monthly average of automobile new
loans increased from R$38.5 millions to R$60.5 millions, i.e., a rise of R$22 millions which meant
a growth rate of 57%.
pre post growth rate
Personal Loans 35,4 68,7 94.2%
Automobile 38,5 60,5 57.0%
R$ Millions
Table 1: New Loans
The monthly average interest rate (% per month) for personal loans decreased from 5.04% per
month before the new law to 4.15% after, i.e., a reduction of 0.89% per month, which annualized
means a fall of 11.22% per year. For automobile loans, the monthly average interest rate decreased
from 2.55 % to 2.41%, i.e., a reduction of 0.14% per month, which annualized means a fall of 1.69%
per year. Thus, the interest rate decline was almost seven times bigger for personal loans in annual
terms. Even though there were timing factors that decreased the interest rates for both personal
and automobile loans, the reduction for the personal loans was much deeper.





































pre post growth rate
Personal Loans 5,04% 4,15% -17,69%
Automobile 2,55% 2,41% -5,59%
Table 2: Interest rate
% per month
Analyzing the above information as growth rate, we notice that the new law a⁄ects strongly
the personal loans in both considered variables (see Figure 3). The personal new loans su⁄ered a
much higher increase than the automobile new loans, 94% against 57%. Also, the reduction of the
interest rate was much stronger for personal loans, 17% against 5%.
To sum up, the descriptive statistics show that at the time which new law was implemented,
there was a generalized downward trend in the interest rate and upward trend in the new loans
volume, but these trends were more pronounced for personal loans.






















In this section our objective is to identify the average e⁄ect of the new law on personal credit,
i.e., the average impact of treatment on the treated. Speci￿cally, we are interested in compar-
ing personal loans when payroll loans are allowed to the counterfactual, that is, personal loans
when payroll loans are not allowed for the treatment group at the same point in time. Since the
counterfactual is never observed, we must estimate it.
In principle, we would like to randomly assign the type of credit bene￿tted and non-bene￿tted
with the new law and compare the average outcomes of the two groups. In the absence of a
controlled randomized trial, we are forced to turn to nonexperimental methods that mimic it
under reasonable conditions. A major concern is that the personal credit could be signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from the type of credit that are not a⁄ected by the new law and that these di⁄erences
may be correlated with our dependent variables. In principle, many of the types of (unobservable)
characteristics that may confound identi￿cation are those that vary across types of credit but are
￿xed over time. A common method of controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity is
to use panel data and estimate di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences models.
Therefore, without the bene￿t of a controlled randomized trial, we turn to a di⁄erence-in-
di⁄erences approach, which compares the change in outcomes in the treatment group before and
after the intervention to the change in outcomes in the control group. By comparing changes,
we control for observed and unobserved time-invariant characteristics to the pair type of credit-
￿nancial institution that might be correlated with the government authorization as well as with
personal loans. The change in the control group is an estimate of the true counterfactual, that
is, what would have happened to the treatment group if there had been no intervention. In this
paper we use automobile loans since we believe that its ful￿ll the characteristics of a good control.
Another way to state this is that the change in outcomes in treatment group controls for ￿xed
characteristics and the change in outcomes in the control group controls for time-varying factors
that are common to both control and treatment groups.
The di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence model10 can be speci￿ed as a two-way ￿xed-e⁄ect linear regression
model:
yit = ci + ’t + ￿ ￿ dIi ￿ dTit + "it: (1)
The right-hand side of the equation include ￿xed e⁄ects to the pair type of credit-￿nancial
institution to control for speci￿c factors that are ￿xed over time, the month ￿xed e⁄ects to control
for factors that vary over time but are common across the cross-section, and the coe¢ cient ￿ that
is the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimator of the impact of new law of payroll loans.
We de￿ne the di⁄-in-di⁄ dummy variable as dIi ￿ dTit; where:
￿ dIi: is a dummy variable that assumes 1 when the cross section unit i belongs to the treatment
group (the ￿nancial institutions that provide personal loans) and 0 otherwise;
￿ dTit: is a dummy variable that assumes 1 if the observed period is after the regulation of the
payroll loans concession according to the new law and 0 otherwise. For the institutions that
are able to give payroll loans this dummy variable is 1 after the date that the institution
singed the contract with the INSS, that made it able to give payroll loans for retires and
pensioners and 0 otherwise. For the institutions that are not able such date is arbitrary, so
we will estimate some models varying the threshold point.
10See Meyer (1995).
7In this model, ￿ is the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimate of the (average) e⁄ect of new law of
payroll loans on personal loans. The key identifying assumption for this interpretation is that the
change in loans variables in control group is an unbiased estimate of the counterfactual. While we
cannot directly test this assumption, we can test whether the secular time trends in the control
and treatment variable of loans were the same in the preintervention periods. If the secular trends
are the same in the preintervention periods, then it is likely that they would have been the same
in the postintervention period if the treated type of loan had not su⁄ered in￿ uence of the new law.

















































Implementation of the New Law





















































Personal Credit Implementation of the New Law
Figures 4 and 5 already suggest that the growth in interest rates and new loans in treatment
(personal loans) and control (automobile loans) groups were the same before the new law take e⁄ect.
Notice that for the period before the new law the path of both variables for the control group is
similar to the treatment group, occurring a detach only after the new law implementation. This
8feature would indicate that the variable automobile loans could be a good control for the treatment
group personal loans.
We formally test that the preintervention time trends for the control and treatment groups are
not di⁄erent by testing the hypothesis that growth in new loans and interest rates for both groups
was the same in the pre￿ new law period. To conduct the test we regress changes in new loans and
interest rates over the period January 2003￿ March 2004 against an indicator of the type of loan and
dummies of month and cross-section characteristics. The hypothesis is rejected if the coe¢ cient
on the dummy of type of loans is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. The results are presented in
column 1 and 2 of table 3. We cannot reject the hypothesis that growth in both variables was the
same in both control and treatment groups in the pre￿ new law period.
New Loans Interest Rate
OLS OLS
(1) (2)
Personal Loans (=1) 0.66  -0.07
(0.49)  (0.44)
Fixed effects Yes        Yes
Number of obs 1585 1557




Tabela 3: Growth Rate (Difference)*
4.1 Direct E⁄ects
In this subsection we analize the direct e⁄ect of the new law. This e⁄ect is de￿ned as the impact
of the new law over the ￿nancial institutions that were authorized by the government to o⁄er the
payroll loans. In this case all ￿nancial institutions of the sample became able to o⁄er payroll credit
at one point in time (the month that the institution signed the contract with INSS).
The table 4 presents the estimation results of the equation (1) for both the dependent variables:
new loans (R$ millions) and interest rate (% per month). Column 1 report the direct e⁄ect of
the new law on new personal loans. It is associated with an increase of R$ 46.6 millions in the
personal credit negotiated by the ￿nancial institutions allowed to o⁄er the payroll loans. The
average of new loans for this group before the new law was R$57 millions, occurring an increase
of R$70 millions after the new law. Thus, approximately 67% of such increase was caused by the
new law. The column 2 that presents the direct e⁄ect over the interest rate points to a decrease
of 0.62% per month, which means a decrease of 7.4% per year. Comparing to the levels of interest
rate for the this group before treatment period we can say that the new law brought a reduction
of approximately 11% in the rate (44% of the post-treatment total fall). Both estimations are
statistically signi￿cant at 1% level.
Both e⁄ects are according to our expectations. Since the new law reduces the moral hazard
problem, it increases the expected return of lenders due to the reduction of probability debtors￿
default. It induces the lenders to expand the supply credit at better terms. In response to this
improvement in the personal credit, debtors tend to demand such type of loans.
9New Loans Interest Rate
(R$ millions) (% per month)
Personal Loans (=1) 46.6 -0.62%
(<0.01) (<0.01)
fixed effects Yes Yes
R
2 0.91 0.93
Number of obs 1850 1627
* p-value in parentheses
Robust standard errors
Table 4: Difference-in-Difference Models for the direct effect*
4.2 Indirect E⁄ects
In this subsection we analize the indirect e⁄ect of the new law. This e⁄ect is de￿ned as the impact
of the new law on ￿nancial institutions that were not allowed to o⁄er the payroll loans. Since the
procedure of making ￿nancial institutions able to o⁄er payroll loans is continuous through time11,
we use as threshold point di⁄erent dates to capture the new law￿ s e⁄ect.
Tables 5 and 6 present the estimation results of the equation (1) for both dependent variables:
interest rate (% per month) and new loans (R$millions) respectively. Columns 1 to 4 of the table
5 report the results for interest rate varying the threshold point that de￿nes the pre- and post-
treatment period to the ￿nancial institutions that are not able to o⁄er payroll loans. The indirect
e⁄ect of the new law is associated with a decrease in the interest rate of personal loans varying
from 0.41% to 0.43%. Comparing to the levels of interest rate for the this group before treatment
period (5.5%) we can say that the new law produced, at most, a reduction of 7.8% in the rate
(61% of the total fall, since the post-treatment interest rate is 4.8%). Also, the columns 1 to 4 of
the table 6 show that the new law is associated with a reduction in the new personal loans, which
increases ￿ together with the number of ￿nancial institutions that provide payroll loans ￿ from
R$ 14.1 millions to R$19 millions. All results are highly signi￿cant.
Interest Rate (% per month)*
OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4)
Personal Loans (=1) -0.41% -0.40% -0.43% -0.43%
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)
fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Threshold Point May 2004 September 2004 January 2005 May 2005
R
2 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
Number of obs 3313 3313 3313 3313
* p-value in parentheses
Robust standard errors
Table 5: Difference-in-Difference Models for the indirect effect
11See Table A1 at Appendix A.
10New Loans (R$ millions)*
OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4)
Personal Loans (=1) -14.1 -15.9 -16.1 -19.0
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)
fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Threshold Point May 2004 September 2004 January 2005 May 2005
R
2 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
Number of obs 3709 3709 3709 3709
* p-value in parentheses
Robust standard errors
Table 6: Difference-in-Difference Models for the indirect effect
Notice that the indirect e⁄ect is instantaneous for both variables of personal loans. The intuition
behind this result is that the volume of new loans decreases due to the migration of the clients
from the ￿nancial institutions not authorized to supply payroll loans to institutions able to o⁄er
this type of credit, looking to change the more expensive credit to the cheaper loan. Since this
movement represents a contraction in the demand for personal loans in such ￿nancial institutions,
the equilibrium interest rate tends to reduce, as the empirical results indicates.
4.3 Equilibrium E⁄ects
The table 7 presents the estimation results of the equation (1) for the dependent variable interest
rate (% per month). Columns 1 to 4 report the results varying the threshold point that de￿nes
the pre- and post-treatment period to the ￿nancial institutions that are not able to o⁄er payroll
loans. The e⁄ect of the new law is instantaneous on interest rate. In equilibrium, the new law is
associated with a decrease in the interest rate of personal loans varying from 0.34% (threshold in
May 2004) to 0.52% (threshold in May 2005), with all cases being statistically signi￿cant at 1%.
Comparing to the levels of interest rate for the treatment group before treatment period we can
say that the new law produced, at most, a reduction of 10.3% in the rate (58% of the total fall).
Table 8 presents the di⁄-in-di⁄coe¢ cient results for new personal loans variable (R$ millions).
Columns 1 to 3 report the results for new loans as dependent variable varying the threshold point
that de￿nes the pre- and post-treatment period to the ￿nancial institutions that are not able to
o⁄er payroll loans. We ￿nd that, in equilibrium, the new law is associated with an increase in the
new personal loans from January 2005 on, which grow through the time from R$ 5.9 millions to
R$13.8 millions. As we showed previously, the average of new loans for the treatment group before
the new law was R$35.4 millions, occurring an increase of R$33.3 millions after the new law. Thus,
the new law is responsible for approximately an increase of 42% in the new loans.
Di⁄erently from the interest rate, we notice that in this case the impact of the new law has a
delay. We can explain this feature coming from three di⁄erent sources: ￿rst, the initial debtors￿
behavior could be the migration between the both groups of ￿nancial institutions, increasing the
demand for payroll loans from institutions able to supply it to repay more expensive personal
loans to institutions not authorized to o⁄er that credit, which in the aggregated level the personal
loans does not su⁄ers any change in quantity; second, the number of ￿nancial institutions that are
allowed to o⁄er payroll loans increases through the time12 and the time to spread the information
about this new tecnology of loans may be slow.
12See Table A at the Appendix A.
11However, the ￿nal e⁄ect is according to the expectations. Such law helps to complete the
contingent markets once it brings the possibility of people making contracts of future payments
conditioned to future cash ￿ ow. It reduces the number of states of nature in which ￿nancial
institutions would lost their money due to moral hazard actions, stimulating the supply of credit.
All this factors make the volume of new loans increase. Since the new law vanishes a signi￿cant
part of the default, the ￿nancial institutions will be repaid in more states of nature, increasing
their expected value to be recovered. Thus, since the creditors will be repaid in a bigger share of
states of nature, the cost of credit falls. These results show the potential improvements in social
welfare that this law may produce.
OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4)
Personal Loans (=1) -0.34% -0.36% -0.42% -0.52%
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)
fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Threshold Point May 2004 September 2004 January 2005 May 2005
R
2 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
Number of obs 4940 4940 4940 4940
* p-value in parentheses
Robust standard errors
Table 7: Difference-in-Difference Models of Interest Rate (% per month)*
OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3)
Personal Loans (=1) 5.9 8.2 13.8
(<0.05) (<0.05) (<0.01)
fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Threshold Point January 2005 March 2005 May 2005
R
2 0.90 0.90 0.90
Number of obs 5559 5559 5559
* p-value in parentheses
Robust standard errors
Table 8: Difference-in-Difference Models of New Loans (R$ millions)*
Using the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence methodology we are able to take out the bias of a "pure
estimator". We showed in later section that the new loans￿volume increased for both treatment
and control group between pre- and post-treatment periods. So it is important to control for this
generalized trend of growth in the credit market through the use of this estimator. The results show
that even controlling for common temporal trends and for cross-section heterogeneity (the time
and cross section ￿xed e⁄ects) the new law￿ s e⁄ect on new loans is economically and statistically
signi￿cant. It means the new loans￿growth between pre- and post-treatment periods was much
bigger for treatment group than for control group even when we control for these factors.
The economic improvement that the new law brought by eliminating part of the moral hazard
was not only statistical but also economic signi￿cant. Thus, this ￿ndings allow us to notice how
costly is informational failures.
4.4 The estimated elasticity of the supply curve of personal loans
We showed in the previous sections the estimated impact of the new law in the personal credit
market. We called of indirect e⁄ect the estimated impact on institutions not able to give payroll
12loans according to the new law. For these institutions the payroll loans meant a pure demand shock
(as we saw in the indirect e⁄ects subsection), which provide to us the opportunity to measure the
credit supply elasticity for personal loans using the estimated e⁄ect of the new law.
















The D(quantity) (or ￿quantity) is the payroll loans e⁄ect for new loans volume while D(interest)
is the interest rate e⁄ect of the new law. From these measures we can calculate the interest rate
derivative of the credit supply, D(quantity)/D(interest). In order to get the elasticity we have to
multiply this derivative by interest/quantity in the point where the derivative is calculated. This
point is exactly the period before the new law takes e⁄ect, so we get the interest rate average before
new law takes e⁄ect divided by new loans average in the same period. It￿ s important to note that
this is a measure of an ￿average￿elasticity, since we are using average e⁄ects and average values
of the variables levels. Besides that, the measure is approximated, once the interest rate variation
is not necessarily in￿nitesimal. Even so this is an important attempt to get a number for credit
supply elasticity from empirical estimation.
The table below shows the estimates of credit supply elasticity for personal loans. Each of them
uses a cut date for the beginning of the treatment. The estimates vary from 8.7 to 10.8 which
mean that a 1% increase in the interest rate implies a decrease in the new loans volume from 8.7%
to 10.8%. This is a high value for elasticity; this mean that if there is a demand shock decreasing
interest rate from 5% per month to 4.75% per month, new loans volume would fall, on average,
between 43.5% and 54%.
This elasticity measure has important implications concerning monetary policy transmission.
If there is a credit channel of monetary policy, this measure would say to us how credit supply
for household would respond when facing variations of credit demand caused, for example, by a
monetary policy restrictive. This number is also important for calibrating theoretical models with
a banking sector for the Brazilian economy.
13Threshold date %D(quantity) / %D(interest rate)
December of 2004 9,7
January of 2005 8,8
February of 2005 8,7
March of 2005 9,0
April of 2005 8,7
May of 2005 9,7
June of 2005 9,7
July of 2005 10,8
Elasticities
5 Conclusion
The new Brazilian law of payroll loans, launched in September 2003, provides a natural experiment
on personal credit, since it was an exogenous change that a⁄ected only a speci￿c type of loans:
the payroll loans. The payroll loan is a type of personal credit with repayments directly deducted
from the borrowers￿payroll check, which, in practice, makes a collateral out of future income.
The new law provides to creditors the capacity to receive their loans￿repayment immediately,
whenever the debtors have enough income to do it. Thus, such type of loan eliminates a signif-
icant part of the strategic default, diminishing the informational failure costs, as moral hazard.
Theoretically, ￿nancial institutions will be more willing to o⁄er better terms of credit since the
expected value of the loan￿ s repayment increases due to the lower probability of default.
The empirical methodology applied to identify the average e⁄ect of the new law on personal
credit ￿ more speci￿cally over the amount of new loans and interest rates ￿ was the di⁄erence-in-
di⁄erence procedure. The results point to an increase in the new loans and to a fall in the interest
rate. In quantitative terms, our estimation indicates an increase of approximately 42% in the new
loans and a decrease of 10.3% in the interest rate. Therefore, the main result of this paper shows
that the information failures produces a signi￿cant economic cost in the personal credit market.
Besides the ￿nal impact over personal loans, we estimate both the direct and indirect e⁄ects
of the new law. For the ￿rst we ￿nd that the new law caused an increase of R$46 millions in
new personal loans for institutions that are able to o⁄er the payroll loans, while the indirect e⁄ect
su⁄ered a contrary e⁄ect. Mainly due to the migration for the less expensive credit as the payroll
loans, the non authorized institutions had their loans reduced in R$19 millions. The interest rate
falls for both groups but for di⁄erent reasons, for the ￿rst group the lower probability of default
provide a higher expectations about recovery of the debt, which induces creditors to o⁄er the
credit at better terms, while for the second group a reduction in the demand forces the interest
rate down.
This reduction of the demand for the group of institutions not authorized to o⁄er payroll loans
allowed us to estimate the credit supply elasticity of personal loans. The results point to an
estimated elasticity varying from 8.7 to 10.8, which means that a 1% variation in the interest rate
causes new loans variation between 8.7% and 10.8%. Thus, the estimated elasticity shows a very
steep supply curve of personal credit.
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A Appendix
May of 2004 1
September of 2004 1
November of 2004 4
December of 2004 6
January of 2005 3
March of 2005 2
April of 2005 5
May of 2005 5
June of 2005 5
August of 2005 8
Source: Homepage of national press (diário oficial): http://www.in.gov.br/imprensa/in
Table A1 - Number of institutions signing the deal with INSS by month
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